invasion, and over six times the peak force plies for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades build-up during a similar six month period of (MEBs). The first heavy ground combat capa- the Vietnam conflict. Sealift continues to do bility in theater (105,000 tons) arrived by 15 the heavy lifting: over 90% of all cargo was August (C+8). The MEBs were "married-up" moved into theater by sea, and more than 95% and combat ready by 25 August. Eleven addi- will return the same way. tional prepositioned ships from Diego Garcia, the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean Early, accurate identification of lift re- delivered 102,000 tons of Army, Air Force and quirements was difficult and changed Navy equipment and supplies that same week. often. Close coordination between MSC and the Military Traffic Management MEDICAL SUPPORT. Navy medical Command(MTMC)keptthecargoflow- ships and fleet hospitals provided well over ing. two-thirds of in-theat~ medical capability dur- ing the first four months of the operation. In We need more roll-on/roll-off (RO/ accordance with plans, the hospital ships RO)shipstomeetunitequipmentsurge MERCY and COMFORT were activated and requirements. Problems encountered deployed on five days notice. Together with during the breakout of some RRF ships the Fleet Hospitals, they provided the most reflected shortfalls in maintenance fund- comprehensive medical care facilities in the- ing in previous years. ater and the capability to deal with a major influx of combat casualties. World-wide sea control afforded by our naval forces contributed to a respon- SUMMARY. The naval forces and capabilities sive charter market, which reduced the put to the test in DESERT SHIELD/STORM need for activation of the Sealift Readi- were not achieved by decisions made in the last ness Program (SRP) or ship requisition- few years. The high quality people, aircraft, ing. ships and weapons systems involved in this crisis were products of decisions made in the "The successful patchwork of MSCjRRF/charter throughout the 1980s. So a final lesson might and foreign charter vessels used to support DESERT SHIELDI well be that the decisions we make today do STORM demonstrated the need for MSC to be given higher have important ramifications for the future. national priorityand to integrate their operations more closely with the Navy." Affordability has always been a factor in - Admiral J. T. Howe, USN, Commander- such decisions, but current economic realities in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Quick give it greater weight than at any time in the Look First Impressions Report, 20 March recent past. We will have a smaller force - that 1991 much is certain - and a smaller force, no MARITIMEPREPOSITIONING. The matter how capable, will not be present in as m afloat prepositioning concept was validated in any places, or respond as quickly, as the force Desert Shield. No other alternative could which executed DESERT SHIELD/STORM. achieve such early force closure dates. Two In an evolving world which contains squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships unknown numbers of Saddam Husseins, and a (MPS) deployed from Diego Garcia and Guam clear dependence on regional stability for eco- to deliver unit equipment and 30 days sup- - 63 -
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