* SURFACE WARFARE. DESERT Amphibious operations focused STORM demonstrated the enduring enemy attention on the threat from value of long range naval gunfire seaward and tied down at least seven support. Unmanned aerial vehicles Thaqi divisions, even after the coalition (UAVs) were effective in target ground campaign was well under- selection, spotting the fall of shot and way. The responsiveness and flexibil- damage assessment. We are actively ity of amphibious forces was high- looking for alternative long range lighted by successful raids, rehearsals naval fire support systems to replace and feints. The large deck amphibi- the battleships in future conflicts. ous assault ship (LHA) proved its The firepower of surface action versatility, operating significantly groups was augmented with attack more AV-8s than planned (20 vice 6) helicopters (U.S. Army AHIPs and while serving as flagship and con- Royal Navy Lynx). The combination ducting the full~spectrum of other of the attack helos working in con- amphibious operations. junction with SH-60B (LAMPS Mk III) and surface combatants provided * MINE WARFARE. DESERT STORM a highly effective enhancement to again illustrated the challenge of mine surface warfare offensive / reconnais- countermeasures (MCM) and how sance capability. Naval forces used quickly mines can become a concern. the offensive firepower of strike Because of the difficulty of locating aircraft (A-6s and F/A-18s) and and neutralizing mines, we cannot surface combatants to destroy the afford to give the minelayer free rein. Iraqi navy. At last count, 105 Iraqi Future rules of engagement and vessels had been destroyed. doctrine should provide for offensive operations to prevent the laying of "...Ship/aircrafi [helicopter) su?face action groups mines in international waters. Our (SAGS) proved to be indispensable in achieving ASUW Cold War focus on the Soviet threat offensive/RE CCE coverage. "Maritime patrol aircraft CM PA) played a major fostered reliance on our overseas role in the AS UW success. P-3/NIMROD availability and allies for mine countermeasures in reliability were outstanding, as was the quality of the sur forward areas. The MCM assets of veillance and targeting provided from the beginning of our allies - on whom we have relied maritime interception force operations to the present, includ- for MCM support in NATO contin- ing DESERT STORM. P3C with and without ISAR... were gencies for years - proved their fully integrated with battle force operations." mettle in the Gulf, both in Operation - Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn- EARNEST WILL (during the Iran-Iraq mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn- war) and DESERT STORM. Both mand, Quick Look - First Impress ions operations highlighted the need for a Report, 22 March1991 robust, deployable U.S. Navy MCM AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE. The capability. We are undertaking a comprehensive review of both our entire spectrum of amphibious cap a- mine countermeasures strategy and bility and force structure was used the readiness of our forces to ensure during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. our ability to conduct independent - 61 -
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