WARFICH~NG. Conducting corn- paign and in the destruction of the plex joint operations in a geographically con- Iraqi navy. S-3s also provided critical strained near-land/overland environment tanker and EW support. poses-special challenges for naval forces. Those challenges were met through innovation and * AN~-AIR WARFARE. DESERT teamwork. In general, combat systems, tac- SHIELD/STORM presented an tics, and organization worked as well or better unprecedented AAW deconfliction than expected. While not every naval warfare challenge. All operations were con area was stressed or even tested, naval forces ducted safely and successfully from participated in virtually every aspect of the pre-hostilities through re-deploy- campaign. For example, about one-quarter of ment. There were no "blue-on-blue" all air sorties were flown by Navy and Marine air engagements. Restricted geogra Corps aircraft. Marine forces spearheaded the phy, unusual RF propagation condi- drive into Kuwait. Platforms capable of multi- tions, proximity of the threat from mission o~erations proved especially valu- Iraq and potential threat from Iran, able~ makingmajor contributions in cross-war- the large number of commercial fare areas where demand was greatest. airfields and air routes in the vicinity, the joint/combined nature of the COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. operation and the limited time avail- After commencement of Desert able to establish positive identifica- Shield, Commander, U.S. Seventh tion of potential hostiles prior to their Fleet was designated naval compo- entry into engagement envelopes nent commander. While that new combined to form a most complex, organization worked well, it also demanding AAW environment. highlighted the importance of peace- Coalition air and surface units were time planning relationships and staffs controlled through a complex sea-air- which parallel wartime responsibili- land data link architecture. Some ties and requirements. The Navy is problems were noted - primarily in Working with CE~1TCOM to establish the areas of communications permanent command relationships interoperability - but the overall that will support both peacetime success of joint/combined AAW planning and wartime requirements. during DESERT SHIELD/STORM will provide a solid foundation for ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. future operations. ASW was not tested as there was no threat. While Iraq did not have any "The Arabian Gulf link network was the most com- submarines, many third world and plex ever attempted, and combined U.S. and MNF link-li regional powers do, and regional ships, USN, USAF,RSAF,AEWaircraft1 USAFTACC1and USMC TACCs and TAOCs in a combined TADIL AIBI submarine threats are expected to !TIDS architecture." increase in the future. Primary ASW systems such as P-3s, 5-3s and - Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn- LAMPS helicopters used multi-mis- mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn- sion capabilities to good advantage in mand, Quick Look - First Impressions both the maritime interception cam-' Report, 22 March1991 -58-
| Table of Contents | First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |