UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

and capabilities which, because of the special Those assets - and the dose coopera-
circumstances of those operations, were not tion of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United
realistically stressed, tested or evaluated. Arab Emirates - were key to our ability to
quickly base over 500,000 troops and over
"...Iessons should be interpreted in light of (the) 2,000 alrcraft ashore in Saudi Arabia and the
DESERT SHIELD/STORMscenario, and in some cases may other Gulf States. Even six months would not
be less applicable generally. For example, we did not test our have provided time to build such infrastruc-
open ocean conc~ts. Equipment, tactics, and CWC organi- ture from scratch. In many places we would
zations designed to fight in blue water were modified, often
significantly, in thisgeographicallylimitedjointarena. Some have to operate without it.
are(LC; such as AS Wwere not played at all due to lackofa threat.
As the budget process focuses on the very positive results of Given our present understanding of
DESERT SHJEI,D/STORAi, these facts must not be forgot- Iraq's military capabiliti~s, our nearly six
ten. " months preparation and an uninterrupted lo-

- Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn- gistics train, we enjoyed, in the words of de-
mander U.S. NavaJ Forces Central Corn- fense analyst Jeffrey Record "...a set of circum-
mand, Quick Look - First Impressions stances so fortuitous that it is highly unlikely it
Report, 22 March1991 will ever be duplicated again." For this dis-
cussion, those "fortuitous circumstances" have
AREAS NOT TESThD. Nearly every early been catalogued under three general head-
attempt to extract the lessons of DESERT ings: (1) the galvanizing threat posed by
SHIELD/STORM has begun with a caution- Saddam Hussein, (2) opposition~strategy, and
ary note concerning the "unique aspects" of (3) infrastructure and environment.
those operations and the "lessons not learned".
This assessment reviews those "areas not A GALVANIZING THREAT: Al-
tested" in context with the old and new lessons though there were clearly additional forces at
to foster critical examination oftheentire range work, Saddam Hussein's repugnant behavior
of naval warfare capabilities. Reviewing the aroused unprecedented international opposi-
areas not tested also helps avoid learning the tion, secured U.N. legitimacy, helped mini-
wrong lessons. mize the potential for a significant split with
the Soviets or China, and ensured overwhelm-
DESERT SHIELD/STORM was not a ing domestic and international support for
model for all future operations. The condi- military action. Despitehisbestefforts,Saddam
tions which existed in Saudi Arabia and the was unable to broaden the conflict. Israel
other Gulf states are unique, and not likely to remained on oneofthe sidelines while interna-
be fully duplicated in other remote areas where tional terrorists and Iraq's potential allies stood
U.S. interests require protection. We cannot by on the other. Additionally, other interna-
plan on the advantages of a cohesive coalition, tional actors did not seek to exploit the pos-
outstanding infrastructure, or six months of sible opportunities presented by our major
preparation time. For 20 years, Saudi Arabia commitment of forces to Southwest Asia.
has been over-building industrial, commer-
cial, and transportation facilities, including AREAS NOT TESTED:
more than 30 air bases and eight modern port
facilities. Nor can we plan on the availability * Limited access to critical enroute
of unlimited free fuel and ample supplies of support bases, aircraft refueling
water in a desert environment.

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