demonstrated in many warfare areas but was most evident in the maritime interception cam- paign. Maritime interception was an impor- tant military and political tool from the outset. Enforcement of the U.N. sanctions weakened Iraqi forces prior to the conflict and imposed a heavy burden on Iraq's economy. Through April1991, over 9200 merchant ships had been challenged, more than 1200 boarded for in- spection, and at least 67 diverted for carrying prohibited cargo. Countless ships were de- tened from c~-loading Iraqi oil and otherprod- ucts for export. Iraq's GNP was reduced by half. The impact of the embargo was clearly felt by Iraqi soldiers in the trenches. The eroding effect on their morale and will to fight undoubtedly saved many coalition lives. The maritime interception effort continued even after cessation of offensive operations as a guarantee of Iraq's compliance with U.N. reso- lutions.

    The contribution of strategic sealift was one of the major success stories of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Sealift investments of the 1980s paid great dividends. The early force arrival dates achieved by maritime prepositioning and fast sealift ships met or exceeded our most optimistic projections. Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled ships delivered 3.4 million tons of cargo and - 6.8 million tons of fuels - much of it moved half-way around the world. Over 90% of all cargo was transported into theater via sealift; more than 95% will return the same way.

    The five month build-up period during DESERT SHIELD allowed the Navy to over- come obstades and build teamwork with the other services and our coalition partners re- L- quired to meet the challenges which arose during combat. Once unleashed, a massive joint: and conThined force acted in unison to quickly eject ][raqi forces from Kuwait. Naval

 forces played an essential role. For example1 about one third of all strike sorties were flown by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. Six air- craft carrier battle groups and two battleships were simultaneously engaged. Cruisers, de- stroyers,battleships and submarines launched a combined total of 288 Tomahawk cruise mis- silesfromtheRedSea and Persian Gulf against heavily defended key Thaqi facilities. About 85% of those missiles hit their targets with pin point accuracy, contributing to the early neu- tralization of Iraqi air defenses and reducing the risks for American aircrews.

    Naval forces literally eliminated the Iraqi Navy and projected power ashore. Sur- face combatants, helicopters, carrier-based air- craft, land-based P-3s, and our multinational naval partners all contributed to the destruc- tion of more than 100 Iraqi vessels. Amphibi- ous forces conducted an impressive series of raids, feints and rehearsals which highlighted their exceptional responsiveness and flexibil- ity and paved the way for a most successful deception operation.

    DESERT STORM once again illustrated the challenge of mine countermeasures, espe- cially in a confined area like the Northern Persian Gulf. Finding and neutralizing mines is difficult under any circumstances. We can- not~always afford to allow minelaying in inter- national waters to go unopposed as we did in this case. There is no capability, either existing or projected, which could quickly neutralize over 1000 mines once laid. The U.S. Navy must possess the best mine countermeasures capa- bility available.

LESSONS LEARNED

    The lessons of DESERT SHIELD/ STORM might usefully be separated into three

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