46 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991 early January with Lieutenant Colonel Ernest G. Beinhart III and Commander Ghazi Asleiten, RSNF, as the senior members. The successftil effort by Marines of the force to assist in the training of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Marine Corps led to approval by Headquarters Marine Corps to establish a permanent Saudi Advisory Group. Refining the Plan On 6 January, representatives of staff of the force's major units came to the Safaniyah headquarters to discuss and wargame USMarCent Operations Plan Desert Storm. General Boomer encouraged them to critically analyze all aspects of his plan so that it might be refined. Two days later, Lieutenant General Calvin A. H. Waller, USA, General Schwarzkopf's Deputy Commander- in-Chief, visited for a briefing on General Boomer's concept of operations and to present the CentCom perspective. These events resulted in pivotal meetings on 13 and 15 January when Boomer and his staff conducted map exercises and wargames of the execution phase of the plan with the commanders of the major subordinate units and their key staff. During the exercises, the 1st Marine Division commander, Major General Myatt, raised concerns about the coordi- nation and space required for both MarCent and the Joint Forces Command-East to carry out their plans. Like General Boomer, Myatt was in the habit of conducting round table discussions with his commanders and staff. In the course of one of these, his operations officer, Colonel James A. Fulks, who would later lead an infantry task force through the obstacle belts, argued convincingly that under the existing plan, too many enemy forces were positioned in MarCent's avenue of approach, thus potentially compromising the penetration and exploitation phases. Fulks wanted to revisit an earlier course of action that involved a MarCent breach between the Al Wafrah and Umm Gudair (South) oil fields in the southwest portion of the heel of Kuwait. Fulks felt that this avenue of approach was not only less defended--it bypassed the bulk of the defenders in southern Kuwait- -but it also was more difficult for the Iraqis to reinforce, since only one main supply route serviced the area. It permitted rapid engagement of the operational reserve and was close to General Boomer's objective at the Al Jahra intersection chokepoint. Another factor was the Iraqi command and control system. Many officers studied it and concluded that Iraqi forces above the brigade level were not well versed in coordination with other units for political reasons. They thought Saddam Hussein viewed that as a threat to his power. Therefore, by penetrating along divisional and brigade boundaries, confusion might be sown to the benefit of Marines in the assault. General Boomer was receptive, eyen though logistically it was far more difficult. The clinching argument was General Schwarzkopf's continuing disapproval of an amphibious operation for reasons not yet clear. It gradually became quietly known that the commander-in-chief wanted to use the two Marine brigades afloat as part of a grand deception strategy. (These were the 4th Marine Expeditionary BrigadeFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |