wJTH THE I MARINE EXPED~IONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 43 Supporting the Move North In early January, the MarCent area of operations was significantly expanded north to include the port and airfield of Mishab (Ras Al Mishab), 50 kilometers southeast of the Kuwait border. The Arab forces of the Joint Forces Command-East began assembling in the sector to the north for their attack into Kuwait along the coastal main supply route. Moroccan troops provided additional external security for the Safaniyah area. To the west of Mishab, the MarCent area extended over 125 kilometers and included the western half and all of the north-south portions of the Kuwait border along the heel. Brigadier General Krulak established the Direct Support Command at Combat Service Support Area 1 behind earthen blastwall berms on an otherwise featureless desert about 57 kilometers west of the coast highway at Mishab. This base quickly became known as Kibrit after Abraq al Kibrit, a tiny Bedouin settlement with a few trees and ramshackle houses about 20 kilometers further west. Significantly the base was only 52 kilometers south of the border and ahead of both divisions for the moment, so Krulak had most of the billets and workspaces put in underground revetments. Within a few weeks, Kibrit had a 470-bed ~ospital, 1.8 million gallons of fuel storage, and 15,800 tons of ammunition. Marine engineers and SeaBees widened the dirt track leading past it to eight lanes and improved a disused 6,500-foot dirt airstrip to accept turbo- prop Lockheed C-i 30 Hercules transports. Under normal circumstances, the Kibrit Main Supply Route was a hardpacked marl road, but with heavy use, traffic on it produced either choking clouds of talcum-like dust or small seas of sticking mud in low areas known as sabkha's that presented challenges to driver and engineer alike. The winter rains had now begun. Even though the area's annual average was about four inches, as was typical in the desert, it arrived either nearly all at once or not at all. The winter of 1990-91 was much wetter than normal, possibly exacerbated by the oil well and refinery fires the Iraqis began setting in February. During one storm in early January, 3.6 inches fell on Safaniyah which flooded out excavations for fortifications and the Direct Air Support Center. The low lying sabkha dry lake areas that dotted the area became treacherous and untrafficable. Of particular importance to General Boomer's offensive plan was the granting of rights to use the Mishab Royal Saudi Naval Force port and its adjacent airfield. The I MEF staff believed that port could accept AMSEA- class cargo ships of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron despite its tight channel and turning basin. There were also mine and missile threats along the circuitous route around the Safaniyah offshore oil fields, so the Navy, and the civilian crews of the MPS, were understandably reluctant to attempt it. During the period, there were many references to the "Elbow" of the heel of Kuwait, but there was never any consistency as to its location; i.e., the southwest corner of the heel or the bend near Al Manaqish. Therefore all reference to the Elbow is omitted herein.First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |