36 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991 control with an emphasis on procedures and control. General Boomer, all of his major subordinate commanders, and their principal staff officers had served in combat in Vietnam under that system. As attrition warfare was superseded in the 198Os, there was much discussion within the Marine Corps as to what actually constituted maneuver warfare. Nonetheless, there was general agreement that its characteristics included attacking weak points by strength, a high tempo of operations, and decentralized control with the object "to shatter the enemy's cohesion, organization, command and psychological balance. "24 Further, maneuver warfare required a higher level of military judgment and was riskier than attrition warfare. In the forthcoming campaign, General Boomer sought to shorten his own force's cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action, the "OODA loop," to less than that of the Iraqis. The decision making vehicle for this was intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This system provided an easily grasped series of milestone decisions as the battle progressed. In addition, General Boomer wanted to deceive and confound the enemy's command and control system so that his opponents would not be able to form an accurate picture of what was happening on the battlefield. Accordingly, Boomer ordered the enemy's command and control nodes to be struck by air and electronically spooked, before and during the attack. By assaulting the enemy at his weakest points, General Boomer hoped to minimize his own casualties. By rapidly getting his own forces behind the enemy's first lines of defense, he hoped to create the conditions for making surrender or capture appear inevitable to the Iraqis. While he could not estimate with any accuracy the will of the enemy to fight,~he would do all that he could to demonstrate to the enemy the futility of doing so. As he put it to his command element nine days before the ground campaign: "We will go quickly, we will go violently."~ To accomplish this, General Boomer directed that every commander down to the lowest level understand exactly what his intent and objectives were. Each commander on the battlefield received "mission-type orders" that empowered him to make the necessary decisions to accomplish his mission. If unforeseen circumstances arose, such as a sudden opportunity or a counterattack, each commander was to deal with them immediately rather than buck a decision up the chain of command over tenuous means of communication. If necessary, commanders could even cross the boundary line of an adjacent unit or conflict with a supporting arm. Paradoxically, it might seem that General Boomer's concept required that he give up some of his own discretion or power. In the fast-moving campaign he envisioned, this was inevitable. No command and control system then existed that could paint an instantaneous and accurate picture of what was happening on a rapidly changing battlefield. However, he had confidence in the good judgment of his commanders, just as General Schwarzkopf had in his own. As will be seen, General Boomer also exercised his own judgments and decisions that affected the conduct of the campaign.First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |