WrrH THE I MARINE ExPEDrrIONARY FORCE IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 21 When directed by USCinCCent, USMarCent conducts USCentCom supporting attack to fix and destroy Iraqi operational reserves in southeastern Kuwait to preclude their employment against USCentCom main attack in the west; isolate Kuwait City for EPAC [Eastern Province Area Command]/multinational MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] operations. Be prepared to continue the attack north to support USCentCom offensive operations 12 In fact, this was precisely the mission assigned to MarCent. During the second week of November, the battle staff planning group began to develop courses of action and rough estimates of their supportability. Most of these involved a penetration of the heel of Kuwait and link-up with an amphibious assault somewhere along the Kuwaiti coast by the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade under command of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr. The MEF planners briefed and consulted with Jenkins and his operational commander, Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NavCent), as the concepts evolved. Manning the Force In early November 1990, General Schwarzkopf asked his component commanders to determine what numbers and types of forces they would need to prevail in an offensive scenario. General Boomer instructed Lohman, Majchrzak, and his G-1 for manpower, Colonel Robert K. Redlin, to work up an appropriate force list to achieve sufficient force ratios for an assault into southeast Kuwait. On 8 November President Bush announced the impending reinforcement of Central Command by 200,000 American personnel which included a large number of Reserve units. The reinforcement of I MEF committed nearly all of East Coast-based II Marine Expeditionary Force, including the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Force Service Support Group, and nearly all of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Smaller units would come from III MEF in the Western Pacific. When this happened, I MEF became the largest Marine force assembled since the Vietnam War, approximating three-fourths of the regular Fleet Marine Forces. Plans in mid-November called for the flow of about 25,000 reinforcement personnel to begin about 10 December at the rate of 1,000 Marines per day. To house the reinforcements, SeaBee battalions began construction of six 2,500-man tent camps. In Washington, Headquarters Marine Corps established a manpower stop-loss program: Marines who would be in permanent change-of-station status or released from the service from November 1990 to May 1991 were retained in their stations. This included many already with I MEF. A major additional reinforcement under Boomer's tactical control was to be the British Army of the Rhine's 1st Armoured Division, commanded by MajorFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |