usmcpersiangulfdoc4_051.txt
40                               U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN aULF, 1990-1991

rated as marginal. He appeared to be severely burned and cut, but because of
the darkness, the corpsman was frustrated in his efforts to fully assess the extent
of his injuries. Captain Shupp called for an emergency helicopter medical
evacuation. Within 10 minutes, he canceled the request after the corpsman
managed  to stabilize the wounded Marine. Further evaluation showed the
wounds not to be as serious as originally believed.
   While the injured Marine was being evaluated, Captain Shupp received a
report of possible enemy helicopter activity north of Company A. Concerned
that an attempt was being made to flank his position, Captain Shupp began
preparing the company to move. Fortunately, an OV-10 arrived and quickly
swept the area with thermal sights. The observer found the suspected landing
site to be clear of enemy activity, but he advised Captain Shupp that there were
many burned out vehicles between the company's screenline and OP 4.
   As the OV-l0 concluded its mission, the long night began to give way to
the light of a new day. With improved visibility Captain Shupp could see the
destroyed enemy vehicles for himself. He also saw many enemy troops and
vehicles on the Kuwait side of OP 4. They appeared to be preparing another
attack but Captain Shupp preempted it with a volley of TOW missiles fired from
the company's attached LAV-ATs. The enemy lost two tanks to this volley.
Ten minutes later, a third tank went up in flames when a  section of Marine
AH-i Sea Cobra attack helicopters arrived over the police station and attacked
the Iraqi force assembled there. The engagements distracted the Iraqis and
Captain Shupp used the opportunity to send a platoon towards OP 4 to conduct
a search for the lost TOW vehicle. Within a few minutes, the LAV-AT's
shattered hulk was found and its ruined condition left no doubt that the entire
crew had been killed. After confirming the loss of the LAV-AT's four Marines,
Captain Shupp directed the lead platoon to provide suppressing fire for the
company during its move forward. The company commander concentrated on
working the section of AH-1Ws in a series of attacks and, by 0653, they had
succeeded in disabling three more T-55s. The company captured nine Iraqi
soldiers. As Company A engaged the enemy at OP 4, Captain Shupp received
a report informing him of the presence of an unknown number of dismounted
infantry positioned on the bern~ about a mile to the north. Their presence at that
location threatened the company's left flank. The infantry, however, made no
effort to join the fight and eventually disappeared. Captain Shupp did not believe
it necessary to change position to counter the threat.
   The sudden reappearance of two or three tanks at OP 4 as well as the sight
of enemy troops moving about the station itself brought on a renewal of fighting.
Captain Shupp no sooner completed repositioning his TOWs to fire on the
enemy tanks and personnel than the Iraqis attacked with   a second armored
force consisting of an estimated 15 tanks. Lacking air support, Captain Shupp
decided to break contact and fall back beyond the range of the tanks. He noted
that the time was 0720 and, though the fighting at OP 4 had been going
seemingly without pause for about 12 hours, the company showed no sign of
fatigue. Company A slowly moved back, firing as it went. Its gunnery proved
highly effective and only one tank, a T-55, actually got past the police station.

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