WrTH THE 1ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SNIELD AND DESERT STORM            3?


lOs, the last to arrive in the area, radioed that they were having difficulty seeing
anything on the ground. Twice, Company D's tracers marked a T-55 and twice
the section leader reported that he was unable to acquire the target by this
method. The pilot then said he was going to drop a flare and the forward air
controller was to use it as a reference point for providing direction and distance
to the tanks. Unfortunately, the flare landed a few meters behind the second
from the last Marine vehicle on the left flank and, though the controller reported
the T-55 as 1,000 meters northeast of the flare, a missile fired from the second
A-10 struck the LAV-25 in front of the flare, destroying it and killing seven of
eight crewmen.
   "It was the only time I got scared," Captain Pollard said. "I was in the
center of the line looking for the flare to land in front of me, when all of a
sudden there was this huge explosion on my right. I thought we had been
flanked and had lost a vehicle to enemy tank fire." Confusion also swept through
the company. They had been fighting the Iraqi tanks for almost two hours,
displaying the "discipline and coolness under fire" that Captain Pollard needed
to successfully stand off what he believed were T-55s. He said, "Normally it is
difficult to keep chatter off the radio, but throughout the battle, they maintained
perfect radio silence. The only voices to be heard were those of myself, the XO,
my FAC, and, occasionally the platoon commanders. However, when the LAV-
25 went up, there was pandemonium over the net and it took a moment to settle
everybody down.
   Captain Pollard now faced two conflicting problems. He had to reestablish
contact with the enemy in order to carry out his outpost mission, but he also had
to know what caused the destruction of the LAV-25. Was the vehicle hit by a
round fired from an enemy tank?  A quick sweep of the surrounding area with
thermal sights showed the desert clear of Iraqi vehicles. Meanwhile, Lieutenant
Williams reported that the explosion coincided with the second A-10's run. The
news was confirmed by the commander of Company A, Captain Michael A.
Shupp, who reported seeing the first A-10 drop the flare and the second A-tO
fire its missile followed by the LAV's explosion.
   In spite of the loss of the LAV-25, the combination of 25mm and A-10 fire
stopped the Iraqi attack. Once Captain Pollard confirmed that the enemy did not
pose an immediate threat, he withdrew 1,000 meters to the west, linked up with
Company A, and then relinquished the outpost to Company A while he assessed
Company D's losses, refueled, and rearmed. It was now 2351 and the fighting
around OP 4 moved into its third phase.
   While the fight around OP 4 ensued, the enemy initiated a series of probes
along the entire Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The mOSt serious of these assaults was
against OP 6 which was eventtially attacked by another enemy force of about 50
vehicles.~ The observation post was unmanned. Earlier in the evening, General
Myatt withdrew the reconnaissance detachment and covered it with Company C,
commanded by Captain Thomas P. Protzeller. Company C moved into position
at 2231 with orders from Lieutenant Colonel Myers to establish a position
adjacent to the berm about five kilometers south of the station. From that
location,  Captain Protzeller was to keep both OP 5 and  OP 6 under close