usmcpersiangulfdoc4_035.txt
24                                     U.S. MARINES IN TIlE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991


Moroccan, and Bangladeshi units. Commanding the only large Marine force at
Mishab--a force lacking mechanized equipment but with good anti-tank weaponry
and Marine helicopters--Colonel Admire was anxious to unite with the Saudi
tank  and   mechanized  units.   The   cooperative training    programs  further
strengthened the bonds between the two organizations.42

  The Mobile Deftnse; October through November Training Exercises

    Task Force Taro's emphasis on cross-training with Arab units reflected the
training focus of the October and November period. Following the establishment
of the cement factory defense line, improvement in logistical capability, and an
apparently quite Iraqi Army halted at the border, General Myatt took the
opportunity to improve the division's combat skills. Ultimately, by the start of
the ground offensive, the 1st Marine Division would have undergone more than
four  months   of seemingly     unending preparations. There    were  numerous
repetitive training and tactical exercises dubbed "rehearsals." Training ranged
from practicing individual combat skills to participation in major MEF and
CentCom-directed exercises such as Imminent Thunder, 15-20 November.4~
    Initially, the emphasis was on perfecting tactics of the mobile defense.
However, after United Nations Resolution 688 passed in November and directed
Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, training and planning were
oriented to offensive operations, particularly breaching techniques. The task
forces conducted  frequent tactical  exercises without troops    (TEWT) using
primarily unit commanders and staffs and sandtable briefs. Units were required
to maintain a tactical posture at all times. Less frequent were exercises involving
entire units in order to save on equipment wear and tear. The extent and variety
of training ensured everyone was prepared for a variety of combat scenarios.
It also provided commanders and staffs with a realistic appraisal of desert
fighting which would later be incorporated into operational planning.~

                           The Movement North

    In the period leading to the ground offensive, the 1st Marine Division slowly
moved closer to Kuwait. Its moves were determined by changes in I MEF's
boundaries,  which gradually expanded     the 1st Marine Division's area     of
responsibility. By 17 January 1991 the division's sector covered the Saudi-
Kuwait border to a line 60 miles west of the coastal highway near what was
known as the "Heel," the point the border turned north. The area was initially
occupied by elements of the (Arab) Eastern Province Area Command and the
division's reconnaissance and light armored infantry forces. The balance of the
1st Marine Division was concentrated 40 miles south in the area commonly
referred to as the "Triangle."  The Triangle was a large expanse of desert north
of Jubayl bordered on the east by the coastal highway connecting the cities of
Abu Hydriyah and An Nuayrihah, and the road intersection west of Manifah
Bay.

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