WrrH THE ~ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM            19


Jaber airfield. Phase V followed with the division shifting on order to an attack
northward to seize I MEF Objective C, Kuwait International Airport, and link
up with either 4th MEB or Arab coalition forces. The division was to be
prepared for an attack on Kuwait ~~~y~'S
   In the reorganization of the division that followed, the new G-3, Lieutenant
Colonel Jerome D.     Huinble (Colonel Fuiks moved to command RCT 4),
realigned the infantry battalions to the four task forces. Task Force Ripper
remained the primary maneuver element and was reinforced by 1st Combat
Engineer Battalion (less a contingent transferred to Task Force Papa Bear).
Task Force Papa Bear gained assault amphibian and engineer units to conduct
breaching operations on the right flank of Task Force Ripper.-~6
   The third and fourth task forces were not mechanized. They received the
mission of protecting the division's flanks. Until 17 February, Task Force Taro
(3d Marines) constituted the division's helicopterborne contingency force in
addition to its new role as an infiltration force. To perform both missions,
Colonel John H. Admire, commanding Task Force Taro, designated one of
Taro's three infantry battalions as the heliborne force. In early February 1991,
this contingency battalion,  1st Battalion, 3d Marines, detached to division
control, forming Task Force X-Ray. The fourth major task force was made up
of the headquarters of the 4th Marines and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th
Marines. Similar to Task Force Taro in its configuration, this newly created
unit, designated Task Force Grizzly, also lacked organic transportation.
   By late January 1991, the organization for combat of the division was
essentially complete. There were two further modifications of note. The 1st
Battalion, 25th Marines, had been assigned a rear area security role. However,
intelligence reports  forecast, and General  Myatt  believed  (following the
division's experience in defeating the Iraqi attack on Observation Post 4, 29-
30 January) that once the offensive began the mechanized task forces would be
inundated by surrendering Iraqi soldiers. General Boomer and the division
commanders were determined that these prisoners would not be allowed to delay
the advance. Each division, therefore, established a special prisoner handling
unit. In the 1st Marine Division, this was the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines.31
   Another change was the creation of Task Force Troy by the Assistant
Division Commander, Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude. Brigadier General
Draude intended Task Force Troy to carry out I MEF deception operations. The
initial purpose of the task force, however, was to deceive the enemy as to the
location of the main assault. Next it was to camouflage the shift of the 2d
Marine Division from a position on the 1st Marine Division's right flank to its
left flank by giving the Iraqis the impression that the 2d Marine Division was
still in place. It was then to create enough noise and activity to draw the
enemy's attention away from the western border of Kuwait. Commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Kershaw, Task Force Troy accomplished this
mission through a combination of mock radio traffic, small-unit maneuvers of
tanks and artillery, psychological  operations (Psyops), and artillery raids.
Lieutenant  Colonel   Kershaw   built the task force around   a headquarters