wrrH THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM              S


wanted it in the field quickly and established as a powerful counterforce against
the Iraqi divisions occupying Kuwait. As a result, the few logistics personnel
available moved equipment and supplies too quickly and without accurate
accountability. Naturally, some individuals took advantage of the situation and
a few units got more vehicles and equipment than others. Six months later, the
division logistics officer (G-4), Colonel Jasper C. Lilly, still labored to sort out
the imbalance.11
   The second problem arose over the lack of adequate vehicle maintenance.
When coming off its ship each vehicle needed extensive servicing to bring it
from storage to operational status. Brigade logistics personnel discovered that the
necessary lubricants, tools, and other maintenance items were not immediately
accessible. Those items either were not in their proper places in the containers
or bad been removed to unknown locations during the offload. Working with
whatever was available, maintenance personnel got vehicles and equipment as
well serviced as possible and issued. However, unit mechanics also lacked
proper lubricants and tools and maintenance problems began plaguing the
battalions. Nevertheless, General Hopkins had the brigade deployed and combat
ready. Once the initial crisis passed, there began a stream of vehicles into
maintenance facilities to be repaired.'2   For Colonel Lilly, it meant that the
division inherited a supply and maintenance problem that had to be rectified in
the field.13
   On 26 August, the airlift of the 7th MEB ended and General Hopkins had the
brigade in defensive positions north of the port. Without firing a shot, the
brigade  accomplished its primary mission--the     establishment  of a secure
operations area protecting vital allied logistical bases. That achievement gave
General   Boomer  the time  to establish     the  balanced  and  fully capable
expeditionary force he needed. Later General Boomer stated that:   `The quick
arrival of the 7th MEB and the MPS squadron must have put Saddam Hussein
on notice that our President was serious about defending Saudi Arabia.
   After declaring the MEB combat ready, General Hopkins deployed RCT 7
in accordance with 7th MEB Op Order 003. The mission given to the brigade
tasked it to deploy forces north in its sector no earlier than 26 August. On order
the brigade was to conduct operations to disrupt, delay, and destroy attacking
Iraqi forces in order to protect vital facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl. The
brigade's mission included coordinating with Saudi forces in the sector. General
Hopkins intended to carry out the mission by using Marine air to attack and
delay an advancing enemy. The ground defense was oriented to prevent the
enemy from being able to come within artillery range of the important oil
facilities at Jubayl. Hopkins wanted RCT 7 deployed to battle positions to create
a screening and covering force. If the Iraqis attacked, General Hopkins expected
the Saudi Army to delay the enemy and effect a passage of lines through the
Marine defensive forces. The Marines would then employ long-range weapons
and tank killer teams to ftlrther delay and channel the enemy's advance. A
second handover would follow to the main defensive positions in the main battle
area. The main battle area consisted of battle positions of tank hunter-killer
teams, supporting arms, direct fire weapons, obstacles,  and fixed strongpoints.