WITH TIlE 1ST MARINE DWISION IN DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM              3


   General Hopkins fully expected to have his maneuver battalions issued
equipment and deployed to the field by 20 August. That proved impossible
because of delays arising from the shortage of service support personnel and
from a reluctance on the part of the Saudis to allow Marines to leave the
immediate area of the port facility. With more units arriving every day, General
Hopkins faced the brigade's first crisis. By 20 August, Hopkins had 9,307
Marines at the port, with most confined to four warehouses located on the pier,
where they faced overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and temperatures above
120 degrees Fahrenheit. The shock of unremitting heat proved bad in itself, but
it was the unexpectedly awful living conditions that caused immediate concern.
Marines discovered that the warehouses lacked facilities for washing and the few
available toilets broke down. Efforts to augment the non-functioning warehouse
toilets with portable toilet facilities quickly failed due to overcrowding and
inefficient contractors.~
   Morale among Marines at the port plummeted and unit commanders grew
desperate to get to the field. Major Michael F. Applegate of the 3d Assault
Amphibian Battalion later said of this period, "The time we spent in those
warehouses was the worst experience of my life. At least in the desert you can
move around, and you have the morning and evening breezes."1
   To alleviate the congestion, General Hopkins met with Major General Saleh
Ali Almohia, Saudi Army commander of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,
to get permission for moving  combat units Out of the warehouses and start
establishing defensive positions north of the port. He succeeded and the first unit
General Hopkins moved was the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in the role as a
camp security force. General Hopkins followed it with the 1st Battalion, 7th
Marines. Likewise, individual tank and assault amphibian companies, as each
received its respective equipment, joined the infantry battalions. Within a few
days, Hopkins moved these units north of the port near the Al Jubayl Airfield.
There they began constructing defensive positions as the brigade continued to
build combat power.  On 25 August 1990 General Hopkins declared the 7th
MEB ready to assume responsibility for the defense of the Port of Al Jubayl as
directed in CentCom OpOrd 003.8
   The maritime prepositioning program proved its worth during the deployment
for Desert Shield. Within two weeks it supported the successful deployment of
an expeditionary brigade to a location halfway around the world ready for
combat with sufficient stocks of ammunition and food to last 30 days. The
availability of equipment and supplies enabled the brigade to expand at a phe-
nomenal rate. On 15 August, General Hopkins reported 504 Marines at the port.
Within two days, 43 aircraft flew in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and advance
parties from all major elements of the brigade for a total of 2,936 Marines. This
number steadily increased with over a thousand Marines arriving daily. By 18
August 1990 the brigade had 6,548 Marines. A week later, General Hopkins
reported the brigade nearly 9complete with 15,248 Marines stationed in and
around the port of Al Jubayl.
   The arrival of the first planeload of Marines coincided with the arrival of
MV Born~eyrnan, Anderson, and Hauge of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2.