76 U.S. MARINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1990-1991 than the enemy expected. Caught off-balance, the Iraqis were given no opportunity to respond effectively to the division's subsequent actions. Using superior firepower and rapid maneuver, the division threatened the Iraqi commanders with encirclement in the environs of Al Jahrah and Kuwait City. When they chose to escape the trap, their movement was turned into a rout by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the division's timely actions. What the division accomplished in its area was duplicated, on a larger scale, throughout the theater by the combined actions of the coalition forces. There were some guiding principles which distinguished the division's actions and enabled it to be so successful. Rapidity of movement and shock action appear to be both more necessary and easier to achieve in desert warf&e. In writing about the highly successful British desert campaign of 1918, Cyril Falls states that ". . . the most interesting feature of the campaign . . . was the success of shock action. Almost every charge was made in extended formation and driven home at the gallop . . . . On many occasions it was not the speed of the charge alone but the celerity with which brigadiers and regimental commanders made up their minds which led to success."~ What was true of the British cavalry was equally certain, 73 years later, of the mobile and armored formations of the 2d Marine Division. To General Keys, maneuver warfare is essentially a "way of thinking about everything in combat, the ultimate goal [of which] is the destruction of the enemy." He believes it to be the province of the division and higher-level Photograph by author LtCoi John Kiser and Capt James Van Emburgh inspect captured FRO~ 7 rockets on a mobile launcher.First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |