WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 83 Iraqi representatives met with Kurdish elders and political leaders at Kanimasi on 13 May 1991. The Kurds were pleasantly surprised to discover they were being invited to return to Dohuk. However, they made their return dependant on two requests. First, an agreement had to be worked out with Baghdad to guarantee a return to democratic principles, institution of civil rights, and Kurdish autonomy. Second, they wanted allied security forces to protect them. Without both guarantees, the Kurds would not return. In the words of one Kurd, "We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like pigs."1~ The continued Iraqi occupation of Dohuk remained fl~e main stumbling block to successfully concluding Operation Provide Comlort, and became a very sticky point when the Iraqis refused to leave. General Nashwan told Colonel Naab "If you enter . . . Dohuk, we will . . . take [military] action . . . . "~~ The Iraqi army responded by moving a mechanized battalion nearer to Dohuk. Unsure of allied resolve, Saddam instigated several provocative acts to test the waters. An American EA-6B Prowler was fired on twice during a routine reconnaissance flight. On S May, two Iraqi civilian helicopters spraying pesticides "slimed" Company F while flying over the Marine lines. Although the Iraqi pilots claimed innocence, this incident appeared to be a deliberate provocation. The helicopters were quickly intercepted and forced down. A search of the aircraft revealed a camera and some film, but it was never determined if this was Iraqi intelligence equipment or the im~cent tools of an Iraqi "shutterbug." The chemicals were tested but contained only normal pesticide toxins and the incident was closed. There was a major shooting incident on 13 May between Saddam's palace guards at Sirsenk and the British Marines. No allied troops were hit during the firefight. The Iraqis reported two wounded, but burial parties the next day indicated this report was in error. About a week later, members of the Joint Historical Team were sent running for cover when Iraqi 82mm mortar rounds were fired near allied positions. Several firefights, a few food riots, and continual scuffles broke out between the Kurds and the Iraqis. In Zakho, General Garner became increasingly anxious about fl~e safety of General Nashwan after his car was vandalized by angry Kurds on two different occasions, so the Americans found themselves in the awkward position of defending the Iraqis from the Kurds rather than vice versa.102 Opening Dohuk Fed up with Iraqi harassment, General Shalikashvili decided to use some more "aggressive restraint" and ordered an American response. American air activity increased and Joint Task Force Bravo turned its attention south. Colonel Jones anticipated three possible solutions to the Dohuk crisis: 1) forcible entry of Dohuk, 2) peaceful entry into Dohuk, and 3) neutralization of Dohuk with neither Iraqis nor coalition forces inside the city. Lieutenant Colonel Liun and 103 the S-3 section prepared plans for all three courses of action. The plan to capture Dohuk using military force impacted the 24th MEU (SOC) the most. The 24th MEU (SOC) was given considerable additional combatFirst Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Src Image |