A 1994 congressional report concluded, based on eyewitness accounts and declassified operational logs, that CBW agent exposures did occur ( 11 ). Two other studies reached the opposite conclusion. The DSB Task Force stated it found "no evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was deployed at any level against us, or that there were any exposures of U.S. service members to chemical or biological warfare agents in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia." ( 3) Similarly, an IOM panel found "absolutely no reliable intelligence, and no medical or biological justification for any of [the] reported claims" of CBW exposures ( 6 ). The NIH Technology Assessment Workshop Panel was less categorical, stating that "until it can be unequivocally established that chemical and/or biological weapons were not used and that troops were not exposed to plumes of destroyed stockpiles, the possibility remains that some symptoms are chronic manifestations of such exposure."4 In light of these findings, the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board determined that "although further DOD investigations of individual exposure reports may be necessary, further research is unwarranted unless creditable data establish that exposure to CBW agents actually occurred." ( 12)
Iraqi CBW Capabilities and Doctrine
The primary source of information on Iraq's CBW programs released since this Committee was established is the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), an international body charged with uncovering and eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and associated production facilities. Although the Iraqi government deceived UNSCOM for four years about the full extent of its CBW programs, the defection to Jordan on August 7, 1995, of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel al-Majid, a son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and former director of Iraq's weapons programs, proved to be a major breakthrough in the investigation. After the defection, the Iraqi government handed over to UNSCOM nearly 680,000 pages of documents on Iraq's pre-war weapons programs, including CBW activities. UNSCOM cautions that much of the information contained in Iraq's most recent declarations remains to be fully verified, but recent revelations shed new light on Iraq's CBW capabilities and doctrine ( 13).
UNSCOM Findings Regarding Chemical Weapons. In its October 1995 report, UNSCOM expressed greatest concern over new revelations about the timing, extent, and success of Iraq's VX nerve agent production program. New evidence suggests the VX program began as early as May 1985 and continued without interruption until December 1990. UNSCOM concluded that as much as 400 tons of VX could have been produced on an industrial scale and that Iraq had solved precursor and agent storage and stabilization problems. UNSCOM revealed that a 1989 Iraqi document on VX proposed "the creation of strategic storage of the substance so it can be used at any time if needed."
UNSCOM also noted Iraq's admission of the development of prototypes of binary sarin (nerve agent)-filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs and observed that the newest documentation shows production in quantities well beyond prototype levels. Iraq also has admitted three flight tests of long-range missiles with chemical warheads, including one with the sarin in April 1990.
UNSCOM Findings Regarding Biological Weapons. Iraq's biological warfare (BW) program, as reported to UNSCOM, embraced a comprehensive range of agents and munitions. During the late-1980s, Iraq carried out scale-up studies on the production of anthrax and botulinum toxin, and these agents were weaponized in advance of the Gulf War. In addition, Iraq conducted research on a variety of other agents, including:
After the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi BW program intensified dramatically. Emphasis shifted from development work to large-scale production and weaponization of BW agents. Iraq now claims it had BW bombs and missiles deployed at four air bases around the country ready for launch; these claims have not been verified.
UNSCOM Findings Regarding Iraqi CBW Doctrine. UNSCOM noted Iraqi authorities have made conflicting representations about their plans with regard to the operational use of CBW agents. Documentation now available supports the contention that Iraq was actively planning to deploy its chemical weapons in a pattern corresponding to strategic and offensive use through surprise attack. Although UNSCOM found that the known pattern of deployment of long-range missiles supports this contention, it continues to investigate whether Iraq intended first-use or only second-use of CBW.
Nothing in recent UNSCOM reports has caused DOD to reverse its position that there was no widespread use of CBW agents in the Gulf War. In the past few months, however, DOD has shown a new willingness to reexamine the issue. In Spring 1995, DOD created the Persian Gulf Investigation Team (PGIT), under the direction and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), to conduct additional analytical work in this area. Part of PGIT's mandate is to investigate possible exposures to CBW agents during the Gulf War by drawing on all sources of information, including eyewitness incidents reported to a toll-free number and the full range of operational and intelligence records. During the Committee's October 1995 meeting, a PGIT official testified that the team was planning to investigate CBW issues fully.
In parallel with PGIT's investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Weapons Technology and Proliferation in the Directorate of Intelligence is conducting an independent review of intelligence documents to determine whether the agency's previous conclusions that U.S. troops were not exposed to CBW agents during the Gulf War still stand in the light of new information. The CIA has concentrated its review on intelligence records and limited its assessment of operational records and eyewitness accounts. CIA coordinates its activity with PGIT.
CBW Detection Systems Deployed in the Gulf
The United States deployed several types of chemical agent detectors in the Gulf War as part of an integrated system for dealing with possible chemical warfare (CW). Each service member had access to treated papers (M8 and M9) that are sensitive to droplets of liquid chemical agents. Units responsible for fresh water handling used the M272 Kit to detect the presence of chemical agents in water. Germany provided 60 FOX Reconnaissance Systems, sophisticated armored vehicles equipped with mass spectrometers for identification of chemical contamination. Approximately 45,000 M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kits were provided for use by trained personnel after a unit entered full protective posture to determine if a hazard actually existed.
The M8A1 automatic chemical agent alarm was the primary U.S. system designed to provide early warning of chemical attack during the Gulf War. It suffered from a number of serious deficiencies. For example, it could not detect mustard agents, which Iraq was known to possess in large quantities. In addition, the M8A1 detector had an extremely high false-alarm rate. During the Gulf War, the alarms sounded in response to vehicle exhaust, smoke, dust, rocket propellant, and other common battlefield interferents, and also sounded in response to low battery levels and routine daily maintenance.
All CW agent detection and warning systems deployed in Southwest Asia were designed to detect nerve agent concentrations that would have an immediate impact on troop functioning-i.e., levels that would cause death or acute symptoms. No attempt was made to monitor CW agent exposures at levels below those known to cause acute toxicity. Battlefield detectors could not measure the types of low-level exposure that DOD regulations guard against in nonbattlefield situations.
No real-time biological warfare (BW) agent detection systems were deployed during the Gulf War. Britain, Canada, France, and the United States all deployed air samplers that collected and concentrated aerosol particles into a liquid sample suitable for testing with a small antibody based enzymatic test kit. This rudimentary detection system took several hours to produce a result and could only determine retrospectively if a biological attack had taken place.
DOD is taking action to address deficiencies in detectors that were highlighted by the Gulf conflict. If it works according to specifications, the detector/alarm currently under development, known as the Advanced Chemical Agent Detector/Alarm (ACADA), will be capable of detecting mustard agents, will identify the category or type of agent detected, and will not false alarm or malfunction during or after exposure to commonly occurring battlefield interferents. The response time of the ACADA at the detection threshold also will be shorter than the M8A1, reducing the risk of acute exposure.
DOD has not addressed the issue of monitoring low-level exposures to CW agents. The joint-service requirements document for the ACADA system notes that "the current automatic chemical agent alarm (M8A1) is not sufficiently sensitive to adequately monitor collective protection shelters for detecting sustained low levels of chemical agent and monitoring personnel for contamination." Yet the ACADA system will have the same nerve agent detection threshold as the M8A1 it will replace.
To improve its capability to detect BW exposure, DOD currently is developing BW agent detection systems. However, systems that will provide real-time warnings that would enable troops to take protective measures prior to exposure are a long way off.