Attachment C

EFFORTS ADDRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERNS IN FEBRUARY 26, 1996 MEMORANDUM

Army Inspector General

Inquiry initiated 9/25/96 by Deputy Secretary of Defense John White in memo to the Secretary of the Army Togo West, followed by taskers to AIG on 9/25/96 and 10/18/96.
Taskers focused on these issues: 1) was the presence of chemical munitions detected when the ammunition was destroyed [at Khamisiyah]; 2) was this presence reported, and to what level; 3) were appropriate force protection measures taken during the ammunition demolition operations; and 4) identify any other sites where the same or similar operations were conducted.
Staffed by four full-time equivalents (FTE) conducting interviews and reviewing documents.
Final report scheduled for delivery 5/31/97; expects to provide answers to all questions in taskers; until work completed, AIG is uncertain about the extent of recommendations.

CIA Inspector General

Initiated 10/31/96 by former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch.
Scope focusing on four allegations made by former CIA employees Pat and Robin Eddington: 1) CIA has hidden, and continues to hide, evidence of the exposure of U.S. forces to CW agents during the Gulf War; 2) CIA officials sought to hinder the Eddingtons' inquiry about the exposure of U.S. forces to CW agents during the Gulf War; 3) CIA employees sought to avoid reviewing honestly the evidence the Eddingtons uncovered concerning the exposure of U.S. forces to CW agents during the Gulf War; and 4) the Eddingtons' careers with CIA effectively were destroyed because of their insistence on pursuing an inquiry about the exposure of U.S. forces to CW agents during the Gulf War.
Following the President's February 1997 memorandum to the Advisory Committee, is reviewing the handling of Khamisiyah-related information in conjunction with the assessment of allegation 1.
Nine FTEs conducting interviews and reviewing documents.
No deadline for final report-data gathering complete on allegations 2, 3, and 4 but ongoing on 1; analysis incomplete; no conclusions currently available.

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD(IO))

Initiated 9/25/96 by Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, followed by 9/27/06 data call from ATSD(IO) to the military departments and 11 additional entities.
Questions to be addressed: 1) what information was available to DOD concerning Iraqi CW facilities, including Khamisiyah; and 2) what use was made of this information?
Conducted chiefly via a $2 million contract initiated on 12/2/96 with MITRE, principally for document review.
Final classified report to be delivered by MITRE on 5/31/97; unclassified summary by MITRE planned; ATSD(IO) will review the report and forward his recommendations for any follow-up action and/or correction of procedures.

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force

Initiated 2/27/97 by George Tenet, then Acting Director of Central Intelligence.
Tasked to develop a strategy to: 1) provide intelligence support for inquiries from the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, DOD, National Security Council (NSC), and congressional oversight committees; 2) review previous search criteria used to identify intelligence related to possible CW and biological weapons incidents and conduct additional searches as necessary; 3) review all classified holdings to ensure timely and maximum declassification of documents related to such incidents; 4) ensure transmission of relevant material to all parties in task 1; 5) implement communications process to keep DOD, the Advisory Committee, NSC, appropriate congressional committees, the public, and the media informed; and 6) support modeling efforts.
Staffed by 50 personnel from CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and other DOD units.
Duration intended to be 60 days, no reporting requirements specified, but Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence released on 4/8/97-intelligence and operational failures are analyzed, and lessons to be learned regarding multiple databases, information sharing, "tunnel vision," and thoroughness in information retrieval are reported.

DOD Inspector General

Initiated 3/3/97 by Deputy Secretary of Defense John White (following previous investigations by other DOD offices).
Tasks: 1) follow all leads that can be developed on the location of the original CENTCOM Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical log or copies-both electronic or hard copy versions; 2) gather all originals and copies that can be located; and 3) if a full copy of the log cannot be located, explain why.
IG has been instructed to use all resources necessary to get the job done quickly.
Final report due as soon as possible.