File: 970903_oct1_0022.txt
Page: 0022
Total Pages: 106

NBC Dcfense

(S) @;urvey comments indicate that false Scud alerts contributed greatly to a
d(-.%t-ti.sitiziiig of personnel over timo. By the start of the ground war. many ill Ill(- r(-:Ir
area of operation stopped going to bunkers or did not don their masks when alarms
sounded. Another major concern was the lack of appropriate training on exactly what
the different alarm signals meant. At Camp 5 alarm signals were even changed at one
time during the war without notification of all tenant units. 2 2

(S) After too many false alarms 3d MAW NBC personnel received orders to
unhook the automatic alarm. Afterwards, the alarm was manually activated only after
the data deterruned the missile was heading toward Jubayl and could fall within the
bounds of the Marine Corps sector.23

(S) Enitial Scud alerts after ir-Litiarion of the air war caused a some panic and
overreaction. Marines rapidly discovered if bunkers were oo small and if they really
knew how to get into their NBC equipment. A major concern surfaced when a great
numbe- of chert-dcal protective suits were being broken-out of their sealed package by
many units. [n some cases of false alarm thousands of suits were broken out. This was
significant because chemical protective suits were in critical demand and their
serviceability was dependent on time after break out.

(S) (n addition to false alamis there were noted imtances of "no" alarms. Two
Scuds hit near the King Abdul Aziz airbase, without any alarm to troops.2 4 The closest
hit to Jubayl came from a Scud that broke up above the port and dropped ies payload
about 200 m from Navy ships at the pier. One of the ships was an anunuriition carrier
in the process of ur-doading. in this isolated incident, the US Army Patriot bartery at
the port received no wan-dng of the incoming Scud and subsequently did not fire.
(S) An additional concem at the port was that many ships had no connection to
the port alarm and warning system. Often the only evidence they had of a possible
attack came when they noticed people ashore wearing their chemical protective
equipment.25

(S) Front-line units could not effectively communicate alarms using conunorlly
accepted techniques of saildng metal on metal and use of hand crank sirens. These

22N4CCLS Tape 381
23,MCCLS tape 1058
24MCCLS tape #s 701 and 906
25Discussion comments from the MALS-29 NBC Officer, 3 April 1991
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