File: 970903_oct1_0020.txt
Page: 0020
Total Pages: 106

NBC Defensc

they were nor comfortable %,vi(h their NBC gear, atid used mask carriers for personal
item storage. The majority of suits discovered were green plastic poncho concepts, with
limited protective capability from agent vapors. The prisoners didn't believe drugs of
any kind would do any good if used. They believed Saddam Hussein would use tactical
gasses and they would die along side their captors. One EPW was convinced his uni[
was up front to take the brunt of the artack, and that gas would be used and the
regular army would come be@dnd.20

(S) Survey results indicate that over 60% of the NBC Specialists felt NBC
intelligence was good (see Appendix E-8). A closer look at amplifying survey commenes
indicated that of those who thought NBC intelligence was poor, many were in reality
dissatisfied with chen-Lical agent detector false alarms. Detection false alarms are
considered an operational responsibility not an intelligence responsibility. In fact, I
MEF forces typically relied on the NBC commuaity in SWA for agent detection and
alarm.

(S) Sur-vey data indicates that a significant number of Marines believed they
encountered threat chen-ical munitions or agents during the ground offensive (see
Appendix E-9). Many Marines described encountering chemical munitions at airport
bunkers outside Kuwait City. Another group of Marines said they found a box of
chemical grenades at one of the breach positions. A Marine Corporal and Sergeant
stated that during a sweep through an orchard outside Kuwait city they came across
chemical markings on anunurdtion pits and ran into chen-dcal mines. One Marine
indicated that a cherrucal bunker containing mustard agent was destroyed. There are
no indications that the Iraqis tactically employed agents against Marines. However,
there are too many stated encounters to categorically dismiss the presence of agents and
chen-dcal agent munitions in the Marine Corps sector.

(U) b. Conclusions

2 OMCCLS tape #1058