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File: doc04_17.txt
Page: 17
Total Pages: 23

                                                     March 21, 1991


                       AFTER ACTION REPORT

                         LESSONS LEARNED

                 MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE     COLLECTION

OBSERVATION.  Medical intelligence was unable t9 obt~~n answers to
critical questions in a timely manner.

DISCUSSION.   Medical essential elements of information (EEl)   are
not developed by medical intelligence users or producers.  There is
a lack of knowledge as to how to develop medical EEl and how to
obtain priorities if medical EEl exist.   interrogation of prisoners
or deserters did not include medical information.     For instance,
the incidence and prevalence of malaria in the operational area was
unknown and 0felt to be a sufficient      reat that prophylaxis was
recommended.  This resulted in an e         e logistical burden that
was later determined to be unneces~fl£ .   nterrogation of prisoners
or deserters could have provided some answers to this question and
avoided the logistical problems.

LESSONS LEARNED.    Production of medical    essential  elements of
information (EEl) should become part of the overall development of
the Commander's EEl.

RECOMMENDED ACTION.   Production of medical EEl should be included
in the education of the medical intelligence user and be given
sufficient priority to answer critical questions.    Continuation of
a Medical Cell in the J2 and assignment of a Medical Intelligence
staff officer to the Surgeon's office are options to improve the
interoperability of the Medical and Intelligence communities.


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