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File: aabqn_18.txt
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            and more were directed to higher headquarters--people wanted answers
            so they could make informed decisions--but few answers were forthcoming.
            This was completely new ground and immediate answers were just not
            available. Consequently, most of those who volunteered were unsure of
            what would be in store for them when they returned. At first tasked for a
            three-week deployment, HQ AFRES opted to change it to a 31-day
            deployment so as to gain the maximum benefits for the volunteers and
            issued green identification cards.43
            
            		Another wrinkle in asking for volunteers developed when people
            volunteered to deploy, told their employers and family that they were
            leaving only to discover that they were not needed and could not
            participate in the deployment. That occurred because MAC did not task
            entire units, only specific UTCs, and also because of the strict ceiling
            imposed by the host country at the proposed deployment site. In addition,
            on the day of deployment, operations personnel discovered MAC was not
            going to use the wartime crew ratio of 1.75 for C-130H aircrews as
            operations plans called for, but would instead use a crew ratio of 1.25.
            That meant that some reservists had to be sent home after making involved
            plans to deploy because with the revised crew ratio, they were no longer
            needed.44
            
            		Finally, some scars would perhaps remain for years in various
            units because some people volunteered and some did not. Many unit
            personnel felt that activation of the units would have put everyone in the
            same situation.
            
                    Unit Integrity
            
            		The initial deployment involved five geographically separate units.
            Two of the units, the 440 TAW and the 928 TAW, had never been involved
            in an operation with the 94th. Each unit had to be tasked for personnel and
            equipment and the coordination of  tasking for these units was a
            mammoth endeavor. Personnel tasking was relatively simple but equipment
            presented a special problem because of space constraints. Upon arrival
            
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            43 Intvw, P.R. Stone and D.G. Lanfear with Col William Haber, 94
            CSG/CC, 29 Jan 91; JULLS Long Rpt, 94 TAW/RM/RMX, 24 Apr 91.
            
            44 Ltr, 94 TAW/DO to 94 TAW/CC, "After Action Report, Desert Shield,',
           11 Jan 91; "Desert Shield Lessons Learned Worksheet, 908 TAG/CC.
            
            45 Ltr, 94 TAW/DO to 94 TAW/CC, "Desert Shield After Action Report," 2
            Jan 91.
            
           
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