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3. The language barrier was the major inhibitor of EH efforts to educate local national 
foodhandlers about USAF sanitation and hygiene standards. 
 
4. Food delivered to on-base feeding facilities by local national food vendors could not be 
inspected at destination in most cases because the food was not government owned or 
purchased and because EH was not kept informed about the deliveries. EH efforts to get 
involved in destination inspection of foods were effective in a very few cases. This effort 
was not aggressive in every case. 
 
S. Commander support of EH recommendations for the prevention of foodborne illness was not 
obtained in some cases. Troop morale sometimes received a higher priority (i.e. hot meals 
served under less than satisfactory conditions preferred over MREs). 
 
6. The inspection reporting system used during peacetime was not employed at all deployed 
bases. EH did not, in every case, actually assign ratings to inspection reports (i.e. 
"unsatisfactory") and did not rout inspection reports through Wing Commanders. Commander 
support and food service officer responses to deficiencies might have been more aggressive 
if EH had used the standard reporting system which was well established and used during 
peacetime operations. 
 
7. In many cases, a daily record of menus was not kept by the feeding facilities. 
Epidemiologic investigations were hampered by the lack of feeding facility menus to refer to 
during patient interviews. 
 
8. Definitive diagnoses of AGE cases could not be made in some cases because clinical 
laboratory support was not readily available. Early identification of the pathogen may have 
significantly enhanced epidemiologic investigations and treatment. 
 
9. Detailed reports of foodborne illness investigations were not written and/or forwarded to 
USCENTAF/SG. This deficiency represents a missed opportunity during the deployment to share 
information between bases and to educate food managers and commanders. Detailed reports 
would also have enhanced post-deployment analysis of the foodborne illness risks associated 
with Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. 
 
10. EH training during Operational Readiness Exercises did not include structured food 
safety tasks. EH personnel were not well prepared to conduct, nor were ATH Commanders well 
acquainted with, EH foodborne illness prevention tasks in a barebase setting. 
 
6 
 
		~7.	~ 

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