TASK FORCE III DESERT SHIELD/STORM

File: aaacf_173.txt
Page: 173
Total Pages: 273
DESERT SHIELD/STORM LESSONS LEARNED REPORT #I
 
POC: J. HERBERTSON/SGR/6490 
TITLE: Volunteer Backfill Program 
 
OBSERVATION: The volunteer program was relied upon too heavily in the beginning of this 
contingency considering the massive known requirements. Policy communication was unclear. 
 
DISCUSSION: Volunteerism became unwieldy. In the beginning, our fill actions were 
restricted due to the policy for TAC-gained and TAC-trained IMA volunteers only for TAC 
bases. The great number of short tours, primarily - by AFRES and ANG personnel was also 
counterproductive. As soon as some professionals were confirmed as credentialed, they 
were ready to go off their tours. Last minute tour requests and extension requests were 
also a big problem. Many unnecessary telephone calls, FAXs, and general crisis management 
was caused by this last minute notification. Tour location changes was also a large 
problem. Due to the voluntary nature of the program it was thought that the member could 
go wherever he/she wanted. This caused an administrative nightmare. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED: The volunteer program should always be looked upon as augmentation to 
involuntary backfill, never as a primary means of backfill. The volunteer program also 
needs tighter control 
 
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Recommend three possible options: 1) If a volunteer program is 
utilized in the future, do not rely on the volunteer program as a primary means of 
backfill. Place policy limits on volunteerism early in the program. Limit tour location 
changes. Require tours to be - 30 days or more. Require at least two weeks lead time for 
tour requests or tour extension requests. Try to place volunteers as close to their homes 
as possible to avoid future moves. Establish volunteer program procedures/policies in a 
contingency plan. Bring in a HQ AFRES/SG and HQ NGB/SG representative to work with HQ 
ARPC/SG. 2) Do away with the volunteer program as soon as mobilization authority is 
granted, and mobilize those members on duty as volunteers. 3) Do not establish a 
volunteer program. The program does not work effectively for a large contingency like 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This option is recommended by HQ ARPC/SG. 
 
HQ ARPC/RC RELATED ITEMS: 4,6,9