CLOSE-OUT REPORT

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE INVESTIGATION

 

October 23, 2000

Case Narrative Close-Out Reports are summaries of discontinued investigations into possible exposures of US servicemembers to chemical or biological warfare agents during the Gulf War. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses began this investigation of biological warfare agents in response to concerns Iraq may have used biological warfare agents against Coalition forces and agents may be a cause of unexplained illnesses seen in Gulf War veterans.

 

The Presidential Special Oversight Board requested that we provide a summary of this investigation, which we did at a public hearing on September 16, 1999. Based on that summary, the Board concluded that information obtained to date in this investigation, the emerging results, and the anticipated outcomes from continued investigation are not likely to improve our understanding of any unexplained illnesses. Consequently, the Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended terminating further investigation. In addition, to bring the investigation to closure, the Board requested that we complete a close-out report to present the data, documentary evidence, and findings compiled during the course of the investigation. The close-out report that follows complies with the Board’s recommendation, but if you believe you have additional information related to biological warfare during the Gulf War, please contact my office by calling:

 

1-800-497-6261

 

Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
Department of Defense

2000056-0000006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  OVERVIEW

II.  INVESTIGATION

II .  A.  Methodology
II .  B.  Iraq’s Biological Threat
II.   C.  Postwar Findings
II .  D.  US Biological Warfare Defense
I I.  E.  Gulf War Biological Warfare Medical Preparedness
II.   F.  Detecting, Evaluating and Reporting Biological Agents
II .  A.  1.  513th Military Intelligence Brigade
I I.  A.  2.  Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
II .  A.  3.  US Army Technical Escort Unit
II .  A.  4.  9th Chemical Detachment
II .  A.  5.  Theater Area Medical Laboratories
II .  A.  6.  US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
I I.  G.  Desert Shield and Desert Storm Biological Warfare Agent Detection Capabilities
I I.  H.  Biological Sampling
I I.  A.  1.  The Plan and the Process
II.   A.  2.  Biological Warfare Sample Transportation
II.   A.  3.  Biological Warfare Air Sampling
II .  A.  4.  Presidential Advisory Committee Report
II.   A.  5.  Dead Animal Reports
II .  A.  6.  Biological Warfare Sampling Summary
II .  A.  6.  Biological Warfare Sampling Summary

III.   SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

I I.  A.  General
I I.  B.  Lessons Learned
I I.  A.  1.  Chain of Custody
II.   A.  2.  Biological Warfare Agent Sample Packaging
II.   A.  3.  Biological Warfare Air Sampling False Positive Test Results
II.   A.  4.  Biological Warfare Agent Detection Capability
II.   A.  3.  Biological Warfare Agent Sample False Positive Test Results
IV.  DISCUSSION

TAB A – Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

TAB B – Bibliography

TAB C – Anthrax

TAB D – Botulism

TAB E – Trichothecene Mycotoxin (T-2)

TAB F – Aflatoxin

TAB G – Plague

END NOTES


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