File: 961031_950811_006me_94.txt
Page: 94
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Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94

Filename:006me.94
2 Mar 94

From:   DIA/PAGAlD
To: ASD(AE)
Subj:  Responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94


The following responses to Rep. Kennedy's questions of 22 Feb 94 
are provided for review and forvarding to   [   (b)(6)   ]        
  ASDaPRfaIRM).

Q1.  What constituted the Iraqi chemical/biological arsenal?

Chemical
A:              Iraq was assessed to,possess roughly 1000 MT of
chemical agent equally split between the blister agent mustard and 
the nerve agents sarin (GB) and GF.  Small amounts (tens of tons) 
of the persistent nerve agent VX  were assessed as probably 
available.  The nerve agent soman (GD) and the psychochemical BZ 
were assessed to be in the R&D stage.  Much of the above 1000
MT of agent was assessed to be weaponized in the following 
munitions with the remainder stored as bulk agent:

Artillery     Mortars      Aerial      Missiles
 155mm *       82mm       25Okg bomb          SCUD
 152mm         120mm           SoOkg bomb        Al Husayn
 130mm                   Cluster bombsAl Abbas
122mm rocket *                90 mm rocket
Note:   (1)  *  Preferred weapon for artillery
    (2)  Landmines were assessed as possible.

    (3)  Frog missiles are capable of CW delivery but no evidence
existed for such a warhead in Iraq.

    (4)  The above table and notes are Biological
A:        Biological agents assessed to have been developed by 
Iraq
are  Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax; botulinum 
toxin; and Clostridium perfringens.         assessed that Iraq had 
weaponized  Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin in missile 
warheads and aerial bombs.  The number of BWafilled munitions held 
by Iraq is unknown.

Q2.  What were Iraq's chemical/biological capabilities, including
ability to produce, deliver and weaponize biological agents?
Chemical A:          Iraq was assessed to be capable of producing 
as much as 300 MT. .of chemical agent per month equally divided 
between mustard and nerve agent.   This production took place at 
the enormous $amarra CW facility about 60 Em northwest
of Baghdad.  Historically- Iraq had purchased empty napalm and 
white phosphorus munitions which it filled with CW.  However, 
there were many reports that Iraq was purchasing equipment to 
indigenous ly produce many of the above munitions.
As a result, it was fairly safe to assume that Iraqi CW munitions
were a combination of both imported and indigenously produced 
munitions.  Finally, Iraq was capable of delivering CW with 
munitions listed in Ql.

Biological
            Iraq was producing biological warfare (BW) agents at 
the Salman Pak BW facility, located approximately 32 km southeast 
of Baghdad.  Other sites suspected of producing BW agents were the 
Taji suspect BW Facility just north of Baghdad, the Abu Ghurayb 
Vaccine Plant, Al Kindi in the west Baghdad suburbs, and a plant 
at Latif iyah, within the Al QaQaa Military Complex just southwest 
of Baghdad.  Iraq had the capability to deliver BW munitions by 
aircraft or by missile.

Q3.  Where were these chemical/biological agents stored?  In what
form were they stored?

Chemical and Biological
A:   At least 22 sites, located all over Iraq, were
identified as suspected chemical and biological agent storage 
areas.  This number does not include additional sites where 
chemical and biological weapons were assessed to
be produced.  With the exception of two suspect storage locations
these sites were all attacked.  All sites attacked were either 
significantly damaged or destroyed.  As stated above, much of the 
Iraqi CW agent was believed, to be weaponized and stored in the 
munitions listed in Q1.

Assessed BW agents' would have been stored as liquids or solids 
either in bulk or in munitions.  It was not" known to what extent 
the BW agent stocks were weaponized, but.  Iraq was assessed to 
have BW bombs. and SCUD warheads.


Q4.  Were any biological agents stored in the sites bombed by 
Allied Forces?

A:     There is insufficient information to determine if BW
agents were stored in the sites referenced in Q3 which were bombed 
by coalition forces.  It is known however that Iraq moved key BW 
agent production equipment out of $alman Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb 
and Latif iyah prior to bombing of those sites.  We assess
that BW agents a& as well as some CW production and filling 
equipment from Samarra AA also were moved from these sites to 
unknown locations. 

Q5.  Could any chemical/biological agents have been accidently or
purposefully released?

Chemical
A:   Regarding chemical agents, there is no intelligence that
indicates CW was accidently released.  However the evidence 
surrounding the Czech detection of 19 and 24 Jan 9l, i.e. the 
meteorological conditions, the low concentration and short 
duration of the detection, the extremely localized area affected, 
the
absence of other detections by other units nearby, the topography 
of the area and the fact that no military action took place 
anywhere near the area allow us to rule out the possibility that 
the agents detected were released as a result of combat 
operations. 
[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]

Biological
A:          At this juncture, there is no intelligence information
that BW agents were accidentally or purposefully released during 


the Persian Gulf War.  Additionaly, the effects of any such 
releases were not observed  either in Iraqi civilian or military 
populations or in coalition forces or civilian populations.
In our opinion, no such incident could have occurred without 
animal
and human casualties.


Q6.  Could biological/chemical agents stored in Iraqi sites bombed 
by Allied forces have been carried by wind patterns to troop 
locations?  

Chemical and Biological
A:      Based on meteorological data, the distance from Iraqi CBW
sites to Allied positions, the fact that no Iraqi or Coalition CBW 
casualties (military, civilian or animal)  were observed between 
the bombed sites and troop locations, and that no conf irmed 
detections of CBW were made, we assess that CBW agents were not 
carried by wind to troop locations.  As stated in QS, we believe 
that no such incident could occur without related casualties or 
conf irmations of the presence of agent.

Q7.  What were US/Allied forces capability in detecting biological
agents?  When were these detection capabilities deployed?

A:   There were three countries that fielded biological
detection capabilities,   US,  UK,  CA.  Canada had the simplest 
capability, which was comprised of one or several mobile aerosol 
detection stations.  Each station had  an aerosol particle sampler 
(APS) designed to detect increases in the amount of respirable 
particles in the air.  A diagnostic lab would then be used to 
identify suspect air samples.  The UK fielded roughly eight mobile 
BW reconnaissance systems.  This system included a range rover as 
a platform, APS, an enzyme based manual test to determine the 
presence of biological material vs. dust in air samples, and an 
immunodiagnostic machine for identifying BW agents. The US 
detection capability and when the equipment was deployed will be 
addressed by Operational Forces.

Q15. What is/was known to DoD about Iraqi chemical/biological
capabilities based on US export licenses to Iraq?

A:        Prior to Desert Storm, the CBW intelligence community 
did not routinely review export license applications.  
Additionally, nearly all of the equipment, seed stocks, or 
precursor chemicals imported by Iraq have legitimate civilian uses 
and, at the time, would very likely have been approved.  Today, a 
much more
stringent review regime is in place.




                                  APPENDIX I

         Salman Pak BW Facility
33-l9-26N/O44-lO-22E
R&D, storage and Production (Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin,
Clostridium perfringens)

         Taji suspect BW Production Facility
33-33-l6n/044-l7-46E
Possible site of anthrax spore production

         Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, Al Hindi
33-l8'-28N/O44-l5-49E
Probable site of botulinum toxin production

         Latifiyah
33-OO-56n/O44-l3-l7E
Possible Production (agent unknown)

         Abu Ghurayb suspect BW Facility
33-l9-26N/044-lO-22E
Possible Production and Munition filling
Note:   The Iraqis reportedly were not successful in filling
artillery shells with BW agents at this site.



                                  APPENDIX II

                    BW TARGETS ATTACKED DURING DESERT STORM

Facility                                  Geo Coords           
Date

Salman Pak BW Research and Production (#)  335ON 04348E         
1/17
Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production          3319N 04410E
1/23

Abu Ghurayb BW Production                  3318N  04412E      2/3*

Taji Suspect BW Storage                    3330N  04414E  -  2/l0*

Taji Suspect BW Production                 3333N  04418E      2/8*

Latifiyah Suspect BW Production            330lN  04413E      2/8*


KEY:
(#)  Multiple Targets, Multiple Attack Dates

*    Approximate date of attack

Note:   12-Frame Storage Bunkers bombed are denoted on DIA list 
CBW
Targets Attacked During Desert Storm" furnished to Dr. Deutch'S
office by [    b.6.    ]
 

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